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Motto:  
 
“Totalitarianism was an ideological notion that sustained the complex 
operation of taming free radicals, of guaranteeing the liberal-democratic 
hegemony, dismissing the leftist critique of liberal democracy as the obverse, 
the twin of rightist Fascist dictatorship”(Slavoy Žižek, 2002, 3) 
 
“I urge that we turn Kuhn on his head and demonstrate that a paradigm is 
nothing more than an arrested social movement. This inversion entails that we 
regard inquiry as an especially focused form of political action. Whereas a 
paradigm-based approach to knowledge would declare politics to be vulgar 
metaphysics, a movement-based approach treats metaphysics as inchoate 
politics. Thus, a stable body of knowledge is simply what political action 
becomes once the public space for contestation has been restricted.” (Fuller, 
2000, 402)   
 
Abstract: 
 
Tracing Cold War in post-modern managerial science and ideology one 
encounters hot issues linking contemporary liberal dogmas and romanticized 
view of organizational leadership to the dismantling of a welfare state 
disguised as a liberation of an individual employee, empowerment of an 
individual consumer and a progressive, liberal and global development of a 
market/parliament mix. The concept of totalitarianism covers fearful 
symmetries between three modes of paying the bills for western 
modernization; liberal, communist and the emergent “egalibertarian”(1), while 
the ideologies of organisationalism and globalization testify to a search for a 
post-Cold War mission statement. Messiness of re-engineering the 
enlargement of the European Union testifies to the hidden injuries of Cold 
War, not all of them caused by a class and class struggle. 
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1. Tracing Cold War in ideologies and sciences of management 
 
On April 16, 2003, delegates of 15 member states of the European Union and of 
the 10 states aspiring to membership, had signed an agreement in Athens, deciding 
to formally expand the European Union eastwards and southwards. They were 
abolishing territorial divisions imposed on the continent by a wartime conference 
of western allies and the Soviet Union in Yalta (1943). The latter has been 
regarded as the beginning of the post WWII splitting of the European continent 
into two sides of the “iron curtain”. The one west of the river Elbe was dominated 
by the United States as the world’s largest nuclear superpower defending 
parliamentary democracy and market economy. The one east of Elbe was 
dominated by the Soviet Union as the communist superpower promoting state 
controlled economy under dictatorship of a single party, which, in turn, controlled 
the state. “Eurotop” in Athens came as no surprise. Erosion of political power, 
economic decline and breakdown of the Soviet-dominated side of the “iron 
curtain” became clear in August 1980. The emergence of a Polish mass social 
movement “Solidarity” against the communist power elite in Gdansk shipyards 
was not countered with a Russian military intervention. Crisis management was 
entrusted to the local communist power elite. The unsuccessful “perestrojka” 
introduced by Gorbachev trying to reform the Soviet system resulted in a peaceful 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of Russian armies from central 
and eastern Europe. Cold War’s “iron curtain” melted down, most visibly in 
Berlin, where the Wall separating West Berlin from GDR has been spontaneously 
breached and dismantled by German citizens. The latter have become citizens of 
the Federal Republic of Germany overnight, with East German communist power 
elite offering no resistance. German re-unification was a cold fusion, an inter-state 
merger and a multi-corporate acquisition. Similar processes of peaceful power 
transfer occurred in the other communist countries of central Europe (with the 
exception of Romania). The “round table” negotiations between members of the 
Polish communist elite and “Solidarity” opposition in 1988 resulted in the first 
free elections east of Elbe after WWII and a gradual transfer of power to a 
democratically elected parliament and president. Czechs enacted a sequence of 
street demonstrations, “velvet revolution”, and catapulted oppositional 
intellectuals into seats of power abandoned by communists, and so did the 
Hungarians. 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall (in the fall of 1989) triggered European integrating 
processes, of which the agreement signed in Athens was the latest 
acknowledgement. Cold War has officially ended. Soviet Union broke down, 
Germany re-united. NATO includes Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia and invites Russian military observers. Former communist 
apparatchiks have graduated from MBA schools and run business companies. 
What is left of the Cold War? Has it left hidden injuries in contemporary 
managerial ideology and practices? 
 
When reading handbooks on management used by business schools, one is bound 
to notice numerous traces and hidden injuries the Cold War left on the ideology of 
managerialism, which was implictly embraced by the academic communities of 
knowledge in the west and explicitly by their eastern counterparts. What is a 
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contemporary ideology of managerialism? In its simplest form it can be reduced to 
a set of two basic assumptions; that all successful human activity involves 
hierarchic dependencies (expressed in organizational forms) and that knowledge 
should be geared to the needs of those on the top of the hierarchies, since from 
there it can be implemented an disseminated trickling the benefits down to 
everybody (and thus research programs in managerial sciences should reflect these 
priorities). What are traces left by the Cold War? Mutually reinforcing 
organizational learning across the iron curtain reinforced the implicit ideology of 
managerialism, while the fall of communism erased “the footnotes” obscuring the 
traces of mutual borrowings. Ideological training of the communist party cadres 
has often been criticized as “brainwashing”, but tacit ideological training of MBA 
students in managerialism has rarely been subjected to a comparable sort of 
criticism.   
 
Let us listen to what an average US and western European handbook of 
management (which reflects the sciences of management, trying to accommodate 
ideologies of managerialism) has to say about who managers are and what 
managers think that they do when they manage (which reflects the ideology of 
management trying to legitimise itself with the sciences of management).  
 
Here is an example from a chapter on leadership in an introductory course on 
business management published by the American authors in the USA:  
 
“At one time, managers were called bosses, and their job was to tell people what 
to do and watch over them to be sure they did it. Bosses tended to reprimand those 
who didn’t do things correctly and generally acted stern. (…) Today, progressive 
management is changing. Managers are being educated to guide, train, support, 
motivate and coach employees rather than to tell them what to do. (…) Most 
modern managers emphasize teamwork and cooperation rather than discipline and 
order giving.”(Nickels et al., 2002, 204-5) 
 
The above passage implies that there is a sharp difference between an unspecified 
period (“at one time”) and the present. Second, it implies that some of the 
authoritarian characteristics of individuals in power positions within hierarchically 
structured organizations have disappeared, or at least became less pronounced 
than before. Managers “were called” bosses, they “tended” to reprimand 
subordinates, they used to control and act “stern”. This past period of errors and 
deviations belongs to the museum and not to a corporate boardroom, because 
contemporary managers are “being educated” to coach their subordinates, not to 
oversee them. Managers are expected to motivate subordinates, so that the latter 
voluntarily increase their commitment and input, not to whip them and keep them 
disciplined with fear of punishment or job loss. Managers are becoming 
employee’s best friends, not scourges. Not all of them, though. “Most” modern 
managers understand they have to change – but this implies that there are at least 
some, who do not. Progressive management “is changing” – but this change 
obviously has not been completed yet (has it been completed, then the authors 
would have spoken of significant changes, which had already taken place). 
Teamwork and cooperation are being stressed by modern managers – not 
discipline and order giving. This, however, implies that these managers do have a 
choice – they might have chosen to stress order giving and discipline. The claim 
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that they do not is being used to enhance their image and exhort their modern 
values and attributes in the eyes of a broader public and presumably of all those 
employees who will come in touch with them. When asked to identify properties, 
which made him a successful CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch answered that 
any of his management team colleagues could have done his job, but what made 
him unique was that he believed in corporate values formulated in mission 
statement (though he modestly added that these company commandments are not 
supposed to last longer than 10-15 years).  
 
The passage quoted above is clearly a very strong and obvious ideological 
message. However, it is not openly presented in ideological terms and context. It 
is not a self-enhancing public speech of a CEO of a large organization in a top 
academic institution (Jack Welch spoke at Harvard Business School). This is the 
text of a chapter on leadership in a general introduction to business management, 
meant to teach students how to understand business, business companies, 
managing, leadership and managerial skills. It is supposed to be an objective, 
value-free judgement expressed by professionals, experts in the field of 
managerial sciences. It is published by an established publisher, supplied with 
teaching materials, recommended to and disseminated among business school 
students. It reflects the current ideology of managerialism, the way managers are 
supposed to be and the way they should be perceived be the non-managers.  
 
The analogy between this passage and ideological documents of the communist 
parties in former central European countries is striking. After each crisis, let us 
say in 1956, 1968 or 1970, representatives of the communist power elite spoke of 
the errors and deviations of the past. They assured their audiences that the 
communist party and the secret police might have turned their predecessors into 
bloodthirsty monsters – but this was “at one time”. Krushchev deplored Stalinist 
crimes, but promised never to return to Stalin’s methods of exercising absolute 
power and to stress individual consumption rather than collective armaments 
(nevertheless kept secret police and censorship as useful management tools). 
Brezhnev deplored Krushchev’s folksy improvisations abroad and promised never 
again to loose face in foreign expedition (but he more than matched Budapest 
intervention and Cuban missile adventure with a surgical strike at Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 and a doomed intervention in Afghanistan). They might have deplored the 
fact that a large-scale terror and a network of concentration camps were needed to 
subdue the population, but – again – they were convinced that a modern party 
bureaucrat is changing, becoming a true friend and coach of a simple citizen and 
employee. They might have agreed that maintenance of a rigid hierarchy was 
unpleasant and harmful, but they added that it is teamwork and cooperation, which 
now matter. After the Gdansk strikes of December 1970, bloodily suppressed by 
the former communist leader, Gomulka, the new leader, Gierek, promised to be a 
team player and to “consult” some of his decisions with the employees of large 
industrial centers (where employee unrest was potentially most dangerous for the 
regime and where therefore a token democratic institution of “public consulting” 
was supposed tom placate them). However, although Gierek did promise vague 
consultations, he never mentioned independent trade unions or a relaxation of 
party control – very much like the abovementioned fragment never mentions those 
features of a more democratic and egalitarian workplace, which would emerge 
bottom-up as an initiative of employees rather than managers and would not 
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depend on managers’ good will and “progressiveness”. It took the breakdown of 
Berlin Wall to turn all former communist parties in central Europe into social-
democratic ones (with the notable exception of the Russian communist party, 
which still openly refuses to condemn Stalinist genocide and to reject the 
contaminated name). “At one time” they did not embrace democracy, but they do 
so at present. “At one time” they were authoritarian, but now they are participative 
and democratic. 
 
What makes this comparison between the two ideologies of managerialism so 
interesting? The one disseminated by handbooks written by the representatives of 
the sciences of management can be compared to the ideology of the communist 
managerialism exercised by a party elite of the former communist countries (their 
handbooks also deserve some attention and should be systematically studied, as 
well as astonishing ease with which the young members of the communist elite 
assumed entrepreneurial responsibilities in privatised economies). Particularly 
interesting is the fact that in both cases ideology is used to obscure the workings 
of a system and in both cases it serves to legitimise the power holders. It does 
obscure the fact that no amount of talking about teams and brainstorming can 
diminish the class barriers between top managers and most employees. In terms of 
income inequalities, which increased dramatically in the 1990ies, one can hardly 
disguise enormous differences in – let us say – salaries of Nike top managers and 
the salaries of Nike’s Vietnamese female employees, or a salary of Jack Welch 
and “hourly people” in General Electric. In terms of unchecked power, which led 
to a number of spectacular scandals, of which Enron is the best known, one can 
hardly argue that a hierarchy of a business company is being replaced by a loose 
network of self-managed teams breeding emotionally rewarding communities of 
practice. In terms of the persistence of managerialist ideology in the media, one 
can hardly claim that more people have access to Hardt and Negri (cf. 
Hardt,Negri,2000), Noble (cf. Noble, 1986), or Wallerstein (cf. Wallerstein,1999) 
than to a middle of the road view of the inevitability of a western model of a 
hierarchic business company led by enlightened mangers. This marginalization of 
a leftist critique has recently been demonstrated by a relatively weak and late 
critique of the ideological campaigns launched by the managerial class – the last 
example being “privatisation” (i.e. standardization of managerial controls in 
public sphere, at the expense of politically motivated egalitarianism) and 
“globalization” (i.e. the abolishing of the last pockets of resistance against the 
capitalist world system after the meltdown of the iron curtain). 
  
It is also useful to note that this handbook text has been written in the period of a 
gradual dismantling of a welfare state (first in Britain and then in the rest of 
Europe), the weakening of trade unions and loss of job security – none of which 
had been directly reflected in the above passage, though the following one does 
offer an ideological apology for a loss of job security, hailing it is an enlargement 
of individual freedom: 
 
“In the past, a worker would expect to work for the same company for many 
years, maybe even a lifetime.  Similarly, companies would hire people and keep 
them for a long time. Today, many companies don’t hesitate to layoff employees 
and employees don’t hesitate to leave if their needs are not being met.(Nickels et 
al., 2002, 204-5) 
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While this sounds true, the authors do avoid asking the question about the relative 
imbalance of bargaining power in case of most of the employees (those who offer a 
useful appearance of a symmetry in the above statement belong to relatively narrow 
communities of professionals and top managers). Sociological studies on a relative 
difference between corporate employees (as described by Whyte in his “Organization 
Man” in 1962) and their children (interviewed in the 1970ies and 1980ies), certainly 
confirm a different, less stable, predictable and less single-company bound career 
pattern. “The New Individualists”, who had been traced and interviewed by two 
members of their own generation in the 1990ies (cf. Leinberger, Tucker, 1991) do 
confirm that from the point of view of career paths, an “organization man” has, 
indeed, been changed into a “spider woman” (the term introduced by Rob Swigart - 
cf. Johnson, Swigart, 1994), i.e. career paths have become less predictable and 
employment less secure. However, their conclusions about personal consequences of 
this shift are ambiguous at best, and certainly do not simply validate ideological claim 
about symmetry and fairness in a social distribution of the costs of flexibility and 
accelerated change (lost trust, uprooting, loss of community, individual atomisation): 
 
“The decentering of organizations in which distinctions like large-small, inside-
outside, and even manager-worker are effaced is, like post-metropolitan suburbs, 
providing for the organization offspring yet another example of permeable 
boundaries, shifting nodes of power, and relational systems, in which stability is 
continually deferred. (…) The accelerating penetration of the organization offspring’s 
lives by these highly mobile and decentered systems – showing up in everything from 
art to popular entertainment to residential patterns to organizational structures – 
ineluctably draws personal artifice closer to social artificiality, rendering even more 
irrelevant and unsatisfying the generation’s highly psychologized brand of 
individualism. Moreover, as long-term changes in the social and occupational 
structure, long term economic stagnation, and the closing down of choice bring the 
search for self-fulfillment to a close, authenticity and the life of personal artifice lived 
in its name are being transformed. This unmooring of the generation’s individualism, 
coupled with the proliferation of concrete social phenomena in which identity is 
difference, is bringing into being among the organization offspring a new American 
social character; the artificial person.”(Leinberger, Tucker, 1991,350-1)     
 
This analysis by the children of Whyte’s “organization men” is important, because no 
amount of mourning the loss of social capital can replace an analysis of its causes and 
triggering mechanisms. No amount of theorizing about diminishing trust and a slow 
death of spontaneous associations replaced by “bowling alone” (cf. Putnam,2000) can 
replace actual analysis of the social costs of a maintenance of systematic inequalities 
– i.e. of both hidden and not-so-hidden injuries of a class. The power of an ideology 
in general, and the power of a managerialist ideology in particular depends crucially 
on social effect, on a general perception of a modern workplace as essentially a fair 
place, in which managers and employees strive for the common good in the best 
possible (most supportive, non-partisan) environment. Margaret Thatcher’s famous 
“there is no other way” sums up the overall effect a properly working ideology should 
have. It should present a worldview, in which tacit assumptions make managerial 
hierarchies appear natural and superior to any alternatives. Ideology has to convince 
employees deprived of the trade union protection and job security that a shock therapy 
(employees may be laid off any time but they are also free to leave any time) is 
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perfectly symmetrical – namely the very same managers who lay them off also suffer, 
as a matter of fact managers undergo an even more revolutionary shock therapy, and 
have to cope with an even more difficult situation, stress and uncertainty (and they are 
not only laying others off – they themselves can be laid off on a short notice as well): 
 
“Managers must earn the trust of their employees, which includes rewarding them and 
finding other ways to encourage them to stay in the firm. In general, management is 
experiencing a revolution. Managers in future are likely to be working in teams, to be 
evaluated by those below them as well as above, and to be assuming completely new 
roles in the firm.”(Nickles et al.,2002,205) 
  
This prediction is based on an ideological view, which tends to overemphasize the 
egalitarian and communitarian aspects of social interactions within a contemporary 
business organization, while underemphasizing the authoritarian and formal aspects of 
employee supervision and control. In a sense, this ideological view resembles a 
Potiomkin village, or a propaganda view of the communist society; managers are 
brothers and fellow-employees, friendly coaching and discreetly guiding, working 
arm in arm with the lowest employees. This view, in turn, is based on theoretical 
visions and assumptions expressed in critical, usually postmodernist studies of 
organizations and management (self-managing teams in loosely coupled networks 
coached by benevolent managers). However, these deals and visions of a more 
democratic and open-ended future are now being presented as “really existing 
organizational realities”. An organic, flexible, network-like, learning, virtual 
organization is perceived as an almost palpable, highly desirable alternative to the 
traditional, large, bureaucratic corporation. According to the theoreticians of 
organization, its features are already emerging from the clutter and dust of history, 
and “the future is ours” (that is, the future belongs to the enlightened, coach-like 
managers and their supportive researcher and think tanks in managerial sciences).  
 
Intellectual capital and knowledge management are investigated and presented as 
being more important for competitive advantage of firms today than a financial capital 
(a view, incidentally, which has led many “dot.com” companies to a mass suicide 
when the eBusiness hype wore thin in 2001). The reason for this shift can be found in 
managerial studies (Drucker’s theories are a case in point), scientific journalism 
(Toffler has illustrated changes and shifts in a dramatic and media-tesque way) and 
important academic contributions to the managerialist ideology in the digital age. 
Castells writing on a “network society” or “internet galaxy” persuades not only 
sociologists, Boisot writing on “information space” and “knowledge assets” appeals 
not only to economists, Sennett analysing the role of “respect in a world of 
inequality” interests not only public administrators, and Wallerstein writing on “world 
systems” commands not only historians’ attention. All of them try to pave the way for 
a more dynamic, mutable, evolutionary, partly indeterminate, open-ended, edge of the 
chaos view of organizing and managing. In case of Sennett and Wallerstein, they are 
also trying to move research communities along more critical lines, deconstructing the 
managerialist ideologies and their hidden injuries in local communities subjected to 
welfare programs (Sennett) or in systematic generation and maintenance of global 
inequalities (Wallerstein).  
 
Their views, and those of many other representatives of critical management studies, 
are already traceable in some handbooks of management.  A slightly more critical 
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European author from the UK has this to say about leadership in a handbook on 
organizational change, when criticizing models of management incompatible with the 
empowerment policies and learning organization: 
 
“Western thinking is still more likely to veer towards the idea that there is still one 
best way to lead. However, instead of trying to find a set of characteristics to describe 
what a successful leader is, these ideas concentrate more on how a leader ought to 
behave in order to be successful.”(Senior, 2002, 229)    
 
Notice reservations about a possibility of finding “best way” and a critical suggestion 
that a majority of handbooks are still written from the point of view assuming that 
such a way exists and can be identified. Notice also that she questions a tacit 
assumption that in order to have a functional organization - there must be a manager 
in charge, while the task of a scientist is not to question power relations or hierarchic 
organizations, but to provide a list of the most desirable and useful attributes for a 
corporate “kings”, “princes” and “barons”. The task of a scientist, suggests Senior, is 
to offer a set of guidelines, enabling anybody, who happens to be managing, to 
survive and succeed. She reflects a popular view, which corresponds to a transition 
comparable to a shift from Hobbes’ “Leviathan” (attributes of legitimate state power) 
to Machiavelli’s “Prince” (do-it-yourself manual for ambitious upstarts trying to win a 
throne) in political philosophies of the Renaissance. Her critical and dynamic views 
are based on a body of critical studies, repeatedly making their way in managerial 
sciences of the past twenty-five years (e.g. Weick, Burrell, Morgan, Harvey, Boje) 
Most of these authors were fascinated by Maturana’s and Varela’s concept of 
autopoiesis or Prigogine’s outline of the sciences of complexity. Most of them have 
also attempted to overcome the limitations of scientific methodologies bestowed by 
the neopositivist tradition, which assume linear equilibria and time-reversibility, 
obviously violated by evolutionary development of complexity, not only in 
organizational and social domains, but even in the natural sciences. A number of 
scientists and scholars have expressed their interest in methodologies allowing them 
to deal with complexity; suffice it to mention Marion’s model of an organization as a 
transitory construct “on the edge of chaos” or Alicia’s Juarrero’s studies of intentional 
behaviour as a complex system (cf. Marion, 1999, Juarrero, 1999), Olson’s and 
Eoyang’s or Beer and Nohria’s investigations of facilitators of organizational change 
(Olson, Eoyang, 2001, Beer, Nohria, 2000) and Alvesson’s studies of leadership and 
management in knowledge-intensive companies.(cf. Alvesson,1995,1996,2002) 
Intuitive search for variety and diversity, as safeguards against evolutionary cul-de-
sac’s in organizational development had originally resulted in a limited adaptation of 
a hierarchic organization to the requirements of increasing diversity within. As a 
Canadian (female and critical) author, writing on women becoming leaders in 
business corporations, puts it: 
 
“Companies chose to include women among their leaders, not simply so that they 
could work with women clients, but so the organization could benefit from diversity, 
by combining women’s and men’s perspectives into more innovative and effective 
business strategies. Whereas in the past, the women who fit in – who thought and 
acted like men – were most valued, now companies valued women who thought and 
acted like themselves.”(Adler, 2002, 248)  
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Women are promoted to the upper echelons of managerial hierarchies not only as 
token females for PR purposes – but also because they add to the diversity of 
organization, to the “ideas generating pool”, increasing its chances for survival and 
success in a complex and turbulent environment.(cf. Alvesson,Billing,1997) Gareth 
Morgan has summed these intuitions up in a title of his contribution to a collection of 
critical papers on organizational behaviour – “Organization as flux and 
transformation”. This sudden growth of interest in complexity and chaos theories and 
in the autopoiesis as an underlying mechanism in internally generated change and a 
view of organizations as self-producing systems coincided with the breakdown of the 
Soviet sphere of influence and the fall of communism in the years 1980 (emergence of 
Polish “Solidarity”) –1989 (the fall of Berlin Wall) – 1991 (formal dissolution of 
Soviet Union). Why was the growth of interest in open-ended complexity and flux 
theories stimulated by the collapse of a stable partner of the western world on the 
other side of the iron curtain? Because disappearance of an ideological spectacle of 
the communists on the eastern side of the iron curtain mean that a show going on the 
western side of it also has to be changed: 
 
“It is widely thought that the collapse of Communism in 1989 marks a great triumph 
of liberalism. I see it rather as marking the definitive collapse of liberalism as the 
defining geoculture of our world-system. Liberalism essentially promised that gradual 
reform would ameliorate the inequalities of the world-system and reduce the acute 
polarization. The illusion that this was possible within the framework of the modern 
world-system has in fact been a great stabilizing element, in that it legitimated the 
states in the eyes of their populations and promised them heaven on earth in the 
foreseeable future. The collapse of the Communism along with the collapse of the 
national liberation movements in the Third World, and the collapse of faith in the 
Keynesian model in the Western world were all simultaneous reflections of popular 
disillusionment in the validity and reality of the reformist programs each propagated. 
But this disillusionment, however merited, knocks the props from under popular 
legitimation of the states and effectively undoes any reason why their populations 
should tolerate the continuing and increasing polarization of our world-system.” 
(Wallerstein, 1999, 1-2) 
    
Fearful symmetry of Cold War propaganda wars was based on a simple ideological-
geographic vision separating a “hell” of the other side (“evil communist empire” to 
the east, ”evil capitalist imperialists” to the west, neutral and non-allied countries to 
the “south”) from a purgatory with chances for heaven on “our” side. With “hell” 
disappearing, with “south” and “west” partitioning what is left of the “east”, an 
ideological vision of heaven had to be adjusted, adapted and upgraded, re-engineered. 
A new, horizontal, transparent, networked, learning organization led by new change 
masters, had to be invented, turned into an ideology and disseminated by academic 
representatives of the sciences of management among managers and would-be 
managers (e.g. MBA students).(cf.Kanter,1983,1989)   
 
2. Fearful symmetries and the concept of totalitarianism  
 
Fearful symmetries of the Cold War period included the clash of ideological 
civilizations: the one of a communist east (“let’s abolish inequalities generated by 
capitalism and construct a classless society”, “rise, wretched of the earth”) and the 
one of a liberal west (“let us protect individuals and continue delivering growing and 
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modernizing economy and an increasingly participative democracy”, “liberty, 
equality, fraternity, property and the pursuit of happiness”). The ideological 
juxtaposition of the western side of the iron curtain to its eastern counterpart went 
hand in hand with a double strategy of globally waged wars by proxy and a gradual 
mutual accommodation (especially with respect to restraint in political use of a 
nuclear threat as a result of a “mutually assured destruction”). What were the main 
ideological differences between the liberal and communist ideologies and how did the 
end of the Cold War influence the victorious, liberal one? The first and foremost 
difference was the invention and subsequent discarding of the concept of 
totalitarianism. Conceived in the service of the “western” world, threatened first by 
the Nazi’s, then by the Communists, it was quietly discarded in the course of the Cold 
War (its discarding coincided with the wave of social and political unrest in the late 
1960ies, suppressed on both sides of the iron curtain).  
 
The second was a difference in composition of those groups, which had to foot the bill 
for the post-WWII modernization. In the case of the Soviet empire the heaviest price 
for modernization had to be paid by peasants, who had to become industrial workers 
or state farm employees in one or two generations. Nations forced to develop a 
Soviet-styled political and economic system were paying only part of this price. 
Large-scale terror in people’s democracies after WWII was relatively mild compared 
to the Bolshevik one in Russia after WWI. Unfair terms of trade with Soviet Union 
were less devastating than mass terror would have been. For ideological and military 
reasons their populations could not be exploited as harshly as Russian peasants were. 
In the case of the western sphere of influence the role of those who were footing the 
bill for modernization and industrialization was played originally by peasants, 
independent rural producers, who had been eliminated as a class, coerced to leave 
their small farms and enter the ranks of wage labour (though this process took 
centuries rather than decades).(cf. Perelman,2000) Increasingly, the price was also 
paid by native inhabitants of colonies and semi-colonies and later on by immigrants 
from peripheries or marginalized regions in the world. A process of continuous 
immigration, especially to the USA and to Western Europe is still going on, in fact, it 
forms a stable pattern of migration (increased and tightened border controls stimulate 
illegal traffic in human beings). High standards of living and lack of totalitarian and 
authoritarian repression form the main reasons for this global migration towards the 
USA and western Europe. These regions of the world got rid of the totalitarian states 
with the breakdown of communism., It is not unusual, however, to see totalitarian 
states in Asia (North Korea, Burma, China under Mao), South and Latin America 
(Haiti and Panama until recently, Cuba), or in Africa  (Libya, Zimbabwe) and in the 
Middle East (Iraq, Syria, to a certain extent Iran).  
  
The concept of totalitarianism has been introduced by Hannah Arendt, who relied on a 
number of thinkers linked to the critical theory of the Frankfurt school (e.g. Fromm, 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) but it was politically and ideologically honed by 
Friedrich, Brzezinski and many other authors (including writers of the so-called anti-
utopias: Zamyatin, Huxley, Orwell, who succeeded in communicating the dangers of 
surveillance technologies to broader audiences). As a result of these developments, a 
concept of totalitarianism acquired considerable aesthetic and moral significance. 
Arendt tried to forge a philosophical category allowing her to understand the horrors 
of Nazi Germany and, to a lesser extent, of Communist Russia. At the same time she 
continued a critique of modern technology in service of a ruthless state (echoing 
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Heideggerian critique of technology, hardly surprising in his former student and 
intimate friend), whose power elite evades control of civil societies exercised through 
legitimate institutions (echoing Rousseau’s critique of progress in sciences and arts, 
which strengthens the state but does not improve individual quality of life measured 
in friendships rather than in material possessions). Her successors, most notably 
Friedrich and Brzezinski, however, were less interested in historical background and 
more in a theoretical “umbrella” covering Soviet Russia after 1917, Nazi Germany 
after 1933, People’s Republic of China after 1949, and satellite regimes set up by the 
Russians in central and eastern Europe after 1945. They wanted an ideological 
weapon for a hot period of the cold war (from Churchill’s Fulton speech in 1947 to 
death of Stalin in 1953). Some critics go as far as to suggest that: 
 
“The CIA is said to have financed the Congress for Cultural Freedom in order to 
spread the critique of totalitarianism and thereby close off any temptation to seek a 
third way that would avoid the polarities of the cold war.”(Howard, 2002,104) 
 
A standard definition of totalitarianism has thus become linked to a concept of a 
modern state, with a single dominant ideology (reducing all explanations to a single 
mechanism – for instance class or race struggle), single mass party (mobilizing the 
masses for public displays of support), and an individual (Stalin, Mao, Hitler) or 
collective (political bureau of the communist party) dictator. The ruling party in a 
totalitarian state controls all domains of social life – economic activities, political 
institutions, repressive forces (police, secret police and the military), and culture 
(communications, traditions, education, etc.). Due to modern technology – “big 
brother is watching you” – these modern dictatorships differ from historically earlier 
ones. They have a much higher chance of suppressing all dissent and efficiently 
controlling the masses – they have, in other words, a chance of being truly totalitarian. 
The lot of their subjects differs from the lot of western citizens – the latter are not 
controlled to the same extent in their daily lives by secret police or party officials, 
they can exercise many more rights and legally question judgement of elected 
officials, they are not forced to express political support for a single party and can 
freely choose whether to do so and in what way, they are protected by the legal 
system and enjoy a much more efficient economy. This concept performed a very 
useful role in the first period of direct confrontations of the Cold War, from the end of 
WWII to the first “thaw” after Krushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin in 1953, 
a popular revolt in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and a beginning of a peaceful 
competition and coexistence (1956-1960). However, it clearly outlived its usefulness 
with the emergence of a mature phase of a stabilized and somewhat moderated Cold 
War. In this stage of the Cold War, it became clear that: 
 
“Although justified as an unavoidable fight to death between the crusading, mutually 
exclusive universalist ideologies of communism and capitalism, the Cold War 
developed into a self-interested super-power charade, a cosy condominium for which 
both the Soviet Union and the United States were prepared to 
settle.”(Pearson,2002,192) 
  
This de facto settlement between the superpowers did not abolish an ideological 
competition for hearts and minds of individuals both in their and their enemy’s camp. 
Neither did it diminish the difference between the pace of knowledge development 
and implementation in both superpowers, visualized in their space and defense 
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programs. As the history of Silicon Valley clearly indicates,  odds were in favour of 
the USA at the expense of Soviet Union, which could only secure a rough parity in 
military industry (and only up to a point, before the last generation of smart weaponry 
was being developed), and could not detect, stimulate and implement innovation and 
change, particularly with respect to the spill-over of the results of military research 
into non-military areas (missing, for instance, the entire information and 
communication technology revolution, or the computerization and internetization of 
society). However, this space and armaments race and its symmetry in a worlds of 
two superpowers did render the concept of totalitarianism less useful and tempting for 
ideologues and PR specialists of all sorts of campaigns. A contemporary standard 
encyclopaedia states that: 
 
“By 1960s there was a sharp decline in the concept’s popularity among scholars. 
Subsequently, the decline in Soviet centralization after Stalin, research into Nazism 
revealing significant inefficiency and improvisation, and the Soviet collapse may have 
reduced the utility of the concept to that of an ideal or abstract type. In addition, 
constitutional democracy and totalitarianism, as forms of modern state, share many 
characteristics. In both, those in authority may have a monopoly on the use of the 
nation’s military power and on certain forms of mass communication; and the 
suppression of dissent, especially during times of crisis, often occurs in democracies 
as well. Moreover, one-party systems are found in some non-totalitarian states, as are 
government-controlled economies and dictators.”(The Columbia Encyclopaedia, 
2002)    
 
Thus already in the 1960ies, the concept has become less popular, especially in view 
of the mass repressions against large scale student and anti-war demonstrations and 
the abuse of modern surveillance techniques revealed, among others, in the Watergate 
affair. Moreover, the all-pervasive politicisation of all spheres of life and the 
subjection of individuals to an equally omnipresent state control and surveillance 
appeared to generate a political apathy not dissimilar to the apathy generated by the 
privatisation, individualization, and atomisation of a mass consumer society. The 
latter, contrary to the brief interlude of the late 1960ies (student and youth protests did 
shatter the established political parties in the USA, France, Italy and Germany, but did 
not damage them, neither did they reclaim their entire constituencies), is supposed to 
have generated behaviours incompatible with the logic of collective action. With the 
collapse of the eastern side of global political stage divided by the iron curtain, the 
concept of totalitarianism, quietly laid to rest in ideological arsenals, became a 
potentially dangerous weapon. Similar to the leaking containers with radioactive 
waste left in the production process of nuclear weapons, it is threatening with 
explosion among other critical concepts in social sciences, as soon as analogies 
between totalitarian controls of the totalitarian states and bio-political controls of 
firms, companies, organizations or institutions in non-totalitarian states become 
exposed. This fact did not go unnoticed among the authors of the post-communist left 
in critical social studies: 
 
“When, in the midst of cold war, the concept of totalitarianism was introduced into 
political science, it only touched on extrinsic elements of the question. In its most 
coherent form the concept of totalitarianism was used to denounce the destruction of 
the democratic public sphere, the continuation of Jacobinist ideologies, the extreme 
forms of racist nationalism, and the negation of market forces. The concept of 
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totalitarianism, however, ought to delve much more deeply into the real phenomena 
and at the same time give a better explanation of them. In fact, totalitarianism consists 
not simply in totalizing effects of social life and subordinating them to a global 
disciplinary norm, but also in the negation of social life itself, the erosion of its 
foundations, and the theoretical and practical stripping away of the very possibility of 
the existence of the multitude. What is totalitarian is the organic foundation and the 
unified source of society and the state. The community is not a dynamic collective 
creation but a primordial founding myth.”(Hardt, Negri,2000, 112-113) 
 
“Capitalism and totalitarian ideology have a common source, they share a foundation: 
that dynamic, mobile history that carries the constant threat of the new. On the other 
hand, we do not understand yet why and how really existing totalitarianism comes 
into existence. We know that its seed (or ideological possibility) is born with 
modernity and the capitalist revolution, but we don’t know what revolution is needed 
to overcome and eliminate capitalism.”(Howard, 2002, 117-118)         
 
If the abovementioned authors are right (and they are basically repeating a more 
cautious and neutral comment made by the authors of the entry in the Columbia 
encyclopaedia, albeit with on a more critical note), the main danger of applying the 
concept of totalitarianism today is linked to the universalization of the principle that 
“Big Brother is watching you” in all modern organizations (because it might reveal 
the Cold War lessons learned on the western side of the iron curtain from their eastern 
counterparts) and to the increasing visibility (and ability to articulate their demands) 
of those groups, which are footing the bill for a social development and change 
(because it might demonstrate the Cold War lessons learned on the western side of the 
iron curtain in stimulating and managing learned ignorance about those, who bear the 
real costs of modernization – by rendering them as silent and invisible as, for instance, 
fresh waves of immigrants). Awareness of the first danger allows us to detect efforts 
at the control of an employee through trust, commitment and motivation rather than 
(though often coupled with) through external surveillance and to increase a level of 
voluntary participation and input of employees.  
 
Attempts to apply the concept of totalitarianism to the degree and scope of control of 
every individual in a contemporary consumer society often lead to surprising 
discoveries about “silent takeovers” of the world by multinational corporations, about 
the dictatorship of the “company logos” on screens, pages and billboards, or about the 
colonization of the “Lebenswelt” by imperial armies of “markets” and “states”(cf. 
Habermas, 1981,2002). Some authors note advances made by the western consumer 
society towards an almost “total” domination of an individual’s social environment 
(similar to the one visualised in “Truman Show” and theoretically developed by 
Herbert Marcuse in “One-dimensional Society”, a cult book of the 1968 generation). 
According to some authors, we are totally dominated by a “market populism” (cf. 
Frank,2000) and move around in an impoverished social world. This social world has 
been macdonaldized, malled and lasvegasified (these terms have been introduced by 
G.Ritzer,1996,1999,2001) – and its inhabitants systematically denied a freedom of 
choice and deprived of meaningful alternatives. While the situationist critique and 
Debord’s “The Society of the Spectacle” might be considered the first warnings 
against totalitarian “show” run on the western side of the iron curtain, some of the 
latest exhortations to break the velvet and glass cage of individualized consumption 
appear to express a growing uneasiness of intellectuals (mostly professionals, and 
 13
mostly academic) in the western, capitalist part of the world stage, on which the iron 
curtain suddenly melted down. This western part of the stage had turned into a 
dominant world order after the breakdown of the most significant “Other”, i.e. 
institutionalised, not entirely converge-able, socialist counter-project of 
modernization:  
 
“Because global capitalism is now its own Other – due to the trans-national 
displacement of its major corporations – its domestic politics soon display a paranoid 
combination of elite distance and populist presence that undermines citizenship and 
civic politics.(…) In the name of an absent capital god we are being asked to break 
the civic covenant, to fragment our communities, to exit from the city in order to 
reconnect in an abstractive, vertical union with our global other in the world’s 
finance, film and fashion houses.”(O’Neill,2002,83,87)(2)  
 
The new ideological twist is that these demands are voiced in the name of an 
increasingly rapid organizational change, which is romanticized into a countercultural 
social movement. A metaphor of a long march through the institutions consciously 
alludes to the original “long march” of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army led by 
Mao Dze Dong, and to the use made of this historical process by the young student 
demonstrators of 1968, who were also calling for a “long march” of the New Left 
through the institutional politics of their respective societies. This march has 
sometimes bore fruit; an evolution of Joshka Fischer from an angry radical leftist 
demonstrator on streets of Frankfurt through a deputy for the Green party to a 
provincial parliament in Hessen to a position of Germany’s foreign minister in a 
government based on an alliance between social democrats and the “greens” – is a 
case in point. Nevertheless, this double hint – at the old left’s historical process and 
new left’s ideological metaphor, demonstrates the attempt to romanticize the apology 
of a major rerstructuring and a successive modernizing wave of the western market 
economies: 
 
“Like community organizing, organizational change is a numbers game: a few early 
enthusiasts to carry the message, then a building of critical mass until even avoiders 
can no longer remain in denial. There are always holdouts, there is always pushback 
(Is she serious? Will he fold?), so maintaining the momentum for the long march 
makes a difference. When changemasters are successful, what started as a rogue 
initiative – an opportunity that one person seized – becomes a real option, then the 
norm, and ultimately embedded everywhere.”(Kanter,2002,283)(3) 
 
This ideological use of the radical leftist idiom in the publications of the mainstream 
authors in the sciences of management (Rosabeth Moss Kanter quotes Giddens, who, 
in turn, advises Tony Blair) is coupled with a fairly elitist view of the corporate 
meritocracy needed by business companies. This corporate meritocracy – 
romanticized as “talent wars” - is presented as a generational populism: the ideal new 
employee is free of constraints imposed by his or her age, gender, race, class or 
geographical roots, is perfectly mobile and adapts to a flexible, mutable 
organizational forms. He or she is a perfect “artificial” creative person, freely re-
engineering himself or herself within changeable organizational context and flexible 
individualism. Leinberger and Tucker were discovering these new individualists 
among children of “organization in grey flannel suits”:  
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“An Interim Services/Harris poll found that the new-breed employees are more 
concerned with gaining new experiences and having opportunities for mentoring and 
growth. Traditional workers, in contrast, are more concerned with job security, 
stability and clear direction.(…) Autonomy and freedom to roam are Internet Age 
values.”(Kanter, 2002,199-200). 
 
Kanter is probably unaware of the fact that her ideological arguments echo those of 
the French revolutionaries, who claimed that abolishing the hereditary offices and 
aristocratic privilege they were offering a chance for talented individuals from lower 
social classes for an open, often brilliant career, or at least an upward social 
mobility.(4) She is probably even less aware of the fact that her mantras about 
communities in cyberspace testify to the romantic ideal of a lost paradise of a 
humanized organization. This true organizational community should somehow be 
magically reconstructed due to the power of modern technology and it should be able 
to go together with an increasingly “total” experience of life and work in changing 
business companies: 
 
“The mental boundaries of community can be stretched to encompass more people in 
more places. That builds the cosmopolitan sensibilities and awareness of multiple 
audiences needed for the innovators and collabronauts.”(5) 
 
Is experience of a total closing of a true workplace community, and of the ultimate 
uprooting of the mobile workforce, which should prefer a challenge of change to a 
security of stability an indicator of a totalitarian temptation on the winning side of the 
former iron curtain? Awareness of this totalitarian danger is necessary if we want to 
see the possibility of counter-mobilization of those, who are forced to pay the real 
costs of an economic development and change, of those, on whose underpaid and 
overburdened shoulders successive phases of rejuvenation and reengineering had been 
brought to a successful end; peasants, immigrants, women, refugees. All of them 
conduct a war for recognition (cf. Honneth, 1992), and their failure may signal to us 
the proximity of a totalitarian danger in our modes of organizing and our ideologies of 
organisationalism, which are being modified in the course of the new waves of 
conflicts. 
 
Often termed the war for recognition in the political institutions (a recognition of a 
systematic discrimination, for instance) and for a subsequent redistribution of wealth 
(along the lines already tested by the ecologists, anti-racists or feminists), these new 
social and political conflicts are increasingly assuming a form of a demand for a full 
citizenship in a global community or of a demand for a more transparent 
democratisation of business corporations (it is no coincidence that a serious increase 
in top managers’ salaries in the 1990ies was accompanied by a demand of social 
democrats to make salaries and bonuses of all managers known to all employees). 
Neither such citizenship nor such democratic community exist at present – but turning 
the concept of totalitarianism against a particular mix of economic, political and 
cultural driving forces behind the recent ideology of “privatisation” and 
“globalization” has already started, both theoretically (cf. Lash, Featherstone, 2002) 
and practically (in anti-globalist demonstrations against “corporate totalitarianism” in 
Seattle, Genua, or Washington, and also in a search for a political articulation of 
demands for democratisation and identity in Asia, Africa, Middle East and South 
America). Corporate response can be measured in gradual introduction of corporate 
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codes of ethics, stakeholder analysis and social audits – all of which are being much 
more prominently present in handbooks of business management after the fall of 
communism. Even if most of them are still left to the discretion of top managers, there 
is a growing awareness that some organized stakeholders may make it difficult for 
corporations to avoid damage to their reputations as a result of unethical actions: 
 
“Is there any way to measure whether organizations are making social responsibility 
an integral part of top management’s decision making? The answer is yes, and the 
term that represents that measurement is social auditing.(…) In addition to the social 
audits conducted by the companies themselves, there are four types of groups that 
serve as watchdogs regarding how well companies enforce their ethical and social 
responsibility policies: socially conscious investors (…), environmentalists (…), 
union officials (…), customers.”(Nikels et al., 2002,110)(6) 
 
The above quotation demonstrates an interesting ideological argument. According to 
the author, business companies’ top management has decided to make “social 
responsibility” part and parcel of an integrated decision-making procedure. That this 
claim comes at the time of a widespread unemployment resulting from corporations’ 
quest for cost reduction and globally competitive strategies, is not mentioned, neither 
are direct (benefits) and indirect (social disruption, pathologies) costs of this 
unemployment for a society at large. Presumably the social audit testifies to a wise 
pre-emptive action on the part of the corporations and their leaders. Likewise, 
emergence of “watchdogs” outside of the companies themselves is being mentioned 
as a complementary addition to the voluntary decision on the part of top management. 
Managers audit themselves, but they do not oppose those, who want to audit them 
without a pro-company, in-group bias. Needless to say, this presentation reverses the 
chronological sequence for ideological purposes: in reality, the emergence of those 
watchdogs preceded and caused the adoption of the so-called social audits by 
managers of large companies. These audits are not a reversible form of charity, but a 
rational choice and pre-emptive action. Nike had to suffer as a result of negative 
publicity generated by watchdogs screening the labor relations in Vietnam and in the 
Philipines, in order to undertake a preventive action. General Electric had to suffer as 
a result of environmental activists protesting the pollution levels of Hudson river by a 
GE plant in order to introduce pre-emptive checks and balances. Tommy Hilfiger had 
to suffer as a result of allegedly racist marketing strategies in order to notice the 
necessity for observing the rules of an equal opportunity employer. McDonald’s had 
to face publicized law suits because of unfair anti-trade union policies and negligence 
in observing the environmental standards in waste disposal in order to start evolving. 
Predicting future strategies of pre-emptive action on the part of top managers can thus 
be better facilitated by critical studies of managerial behaviour under the influence of 
external “watchdogs” than by listing codes of corporate conduct and procedures for a 
social audit.  
 
In case of Europe, predictions concerning future strategies of top political 
management of the European Union can be seen as attempts to understand an 
emerging economic and political multi-state corporation, whose top management also 
proclaims an equivalent of a social audit in decision making, but is also spectacularly 
unsuccessful in combating unemployment and tackling the problem of immigrants, in 
spite of the fact that ideological fears of a huge wave of migrant labour from the 
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former communist countries failed to materialize and immigrants from Asia and 
Africa find it increasingly difficult to settle in Europe.  
 
3. Egaliberty, hidden injuries of Cold War and Europe’s enlargement 
 
Hidden injuries of Cold War can be detected by tracing a sudden shift of focus in 
political debates after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War meant the end of a 
choice, either for those in the east, in the west or in the south. Before 1989 one could 
choose (at least theoretically and sometimes politically) between state socialism and 
anti-colonial struggle for national liberation or state capitalism and anti-totalitarian 
struggle for democratization. After 1989 all states were left with capitalism and 
democracy. If there is no meaningful choice to be made between the authoritarian 
communist and the liberal capitalist systems any more, then what is there to choose 
between? Nothing, said neoliberals in their quest for privatisation of public assets. 
There is no other way. The only choices must be made within the only surviving 
system, namely the liberal capitalist one. This has led many ideologues of the “west” 
to a conclusion that history conceived as a blind and chaotic search and struggle 
waged by human societies for a relatively competitive mix of political and economic 
institutions has ended. Thus the economists, consultants and investors descended upon 
the former communist countries with the first package of “shock therapies” designed 
to construct a neoliberal version of market economies. Thus Fukuyama announced the 
end of history exhorting the ultimate victory of a market economy/parliamentary 
democracy mix of the present “west” over all the “rest” of known and imagined 
mixes.(cf. Fukuyama, 1992) From now on,  according to Fukuyama, there will be no 
fundamental struggle about such mixes, since only one has survived, clearly outliving 
and outperforming its rivals. It does not mean that there will be no wars – but they 
will be pre-class wars, wars about values, God and glory (for instance a clash of a 
Christian and a Muslim civilization, or a war on drugs or against terrorism). In other 
words, breakdown of state socialism makes the world safer for the ruling class in the 
capitalist system. Only neoliberal projects count. Those, who would like to side with 
the underdogs and to construct a counter-system or counter-movement more 
conducive to egaliberty, have yet to construct a viable alternative. This is true both 
with respect to the left ideologues and leftist social scientists, or even those 
representatives of the academic communities, who’s sense of fairness prompts them to 
look for egalibertarian solutions. In view of persistent inequalities, ideologues of the 
“postmodernist left” complain: 
 
“Could we have stumbled upon one reason why class is invariably named but rarely 
theorized or developed in the multiculturalist mantra “race, class, gender, 
sexuality”?”(Brown,1995,61)(7)     
 
Social scientists do not offer an unequivocal answer. Most of them would agree with a 
representative of critical social sciences, who concludes that: 
 
“Capitalism has continually transformed itself to the point that we no longer have a 
viable alternative to it. Indeed capitalism is now victorious not only in the West, but 
also on a global scale. In this context, the demise of a revolutionary politics that could 
realize an alternative system seems to be marked by: the decline of socialism as an 
alternative systemic doctrine, the collapse of communism, the decline of the working 
class as a numerical and political force, the increasing disconnection between class 
 17
and politics, the rise of social and cultural movements, including ecology politics and 
feminism, whose political claims are reformist.(…) Nevertheless, class still does 
structure lives, as we may see clearly when we explore the inequalities of major 
western cities.”(Barker, 2002,175)(8) 
 
This meant, among others, that the only strategy for healing the wounds Cold War had 
left on the European continent was to incorporate former GDR into the Federal 
Republic of Germany, re-building Berlin as a new capital, more centrally located than 
either Paris or London, and carefully preserving picturesque scars left by the wall and 
partition) and to incorporate the former Soviet satellite countries into the European 
Union and NATO. The latter has been perceived as a post-Yalta healing process and 
as a rebuilding of the ideal Europe constructed on a fundament of the Greek 
philosophy, Roman law and Christian religion, secularised by political revolutions, 
industrialization and urbanization. The difference between the two processes 
consisted of the fact that in the former, a single state designed a special agency for 
privatisation of the dissolved state’s assets (Treuhand), extended its bureaucracies 
eastwards, but within the same national borders and included new citizens in political 
processes. In the latter case, the eastward expansion of the European Union included 
not only a preliminary process of privatisation of former state assets, and went beyond 
simple adjustment of legal and political systems of relevant nation-states to the EU 
norms. It also involved an ongoing adjustment and re-engineering of the European 
Union itself and dealing with the learned ignorance about new candidate states in the 
older ones. The Cold War stereotype of poor, enslaved, totalitarian societies under the 
evil spell of a Soviet empire has survived the meltdown of the iron curtain – and has 
been resuscitated by the media, which played on subconscious fears that the new 
member states’ unemployed form a threat to the stability and welfare of the older EU 
members. While a repetition of the French defeatist slogan from 1939 – “on ne veux 
pas mourir pour Gdansk” – is impossible due to the NATO obligations, a considerable 
number of citizens in western European societies does not want to contribute to social 
benefits of Gdansk citizens either (on ne veux pas payer pour Gdansk).  
 
The paradox of these negative stereotypes, which form scars of the Cold War in social 
consciousness of the Western European societies, consists of the fact that they can 
only be tackled by the political elites acting to prevent future European conflicts. For 
instance by changing the educational contents of history handbooks, along the lines 
practiced by French-German and Polish-German commissions (so that history cannot 
be used for nationalist  populist mobilization). For instance by more extensive 
exchange of media contents between older and new members of the EU  (so that 
learned ignorance of the Cold War can disappear). However, political elites do not 
necessarily have to be interested in egalibertarian solutions, since this could 
undermine their privileged status. They are much more interested in expert consulting 
and in managerial sciences, which provide quantifiable advice, not in a broader, more 
humanist, more multi-paradigmatic context of contemporary social sciences. What do 
they need, if they are to respond to their constituencies in a sensitive way? What do 
they need if they are to confront hidden injuries of Cold War, of which negative bias 
towards citizens of the former communist countries is the most serious one? What do 
they need if they are to construct an egalibertarian framework for an enlarged 
European Union? A critical voice from research communities? An advice from 
scientific communities, in which representatives of social sciences and of managerial 
specialties communicate and collaborate in spite of paradigmatic differences would 
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certainly be much more useful than an expert report limited by bureaucratic 
frameworks and a consultant’s project limited by client’s demands.(9)  Is it possible to 
find a scientific community, which views its role as a social movement in social 
sciences and is able to furnish above type of advice in spite of serious paradigmatic, 
ideological and other divisions? 
 
It will be difficult to find one among research communities in the sciences of 
management. The latter are still biased and usually follow an old ideological strategy 
from the Cold War period. It prompts them to design such research programs in the 
“west” that can measure consumer satisfaction or even, in most ambitious cases, the 
level of happiness or individual and collective corrections to remedy “ the loss of 
happiness in market democracies”(10). It prompts them to design such research 
programs in the “east” or “south” that can measure the distance, which the “rest” of 
human societies has to cover to begin approximating the “western” societies (tacitly 
assuming that the western societies are either neutrally waiting for the rest to catch up 
or even assisting them, never slowing this catching-up process down or keeping it in a 
low gear).  
 
In the case of the European Union, there is at least an institutionalised procedure and a 
political process, which can lead towards a gradual inclusion of the former communist 
states in the EU and can guarantee a degree of assistance (although even here the 
“intermediate” measures guarantee the spreading of a catching-up process over 10 to 
15 years and a less than full member status for the newcomers). However, in the case 
of the USA, the hidden injuries of the Cold War assume a more subtle form among 
academic representatives of social sciences. Some scientists and ideologues look for 
an ideological justification of systemic global inequalities persisting in spite of the 
neo-liberal programs and try the strategy of “blaming the victim”. Lawrence Harrison 
and Samuel Huntington are a case in point. Having decided that competitive 
ideological and scientific explanations of the growing gaps between richer and poorer 
nations, between democracies and non-democratic political systems cannot be any 
longer explained with the “traditional” concepts of “imperialism”, “dependency” or 
“racism” (they do not explain why, but a reader may conclude that a breakdown of a 
rival system, whose ideology was based on a class analysis of the capitalist 
democracies, invalidates the scientific premises of defeated ideology), they focus on 
another possible explanation of these differences, namely “cultural values”. These 
collective cultural softwares of human societies are allegedly responsible for some of 
them accelerating their economic growth and raising living standards to the western 
levels and for the others’ failure to do so. Huntington and Harrison invited – among 
others – Inglehart, Landes, Porter, Sachs and Fukuyama to a conference entitled 
“Culture Matters” at the Harvard University and duly published the proceedings of it. 
Comparing South Korea and Ghana in the 1960ies and 1990ies, Huntington opens the 
proceedings by contrasting similar levels of economic performance displayed by 
South Korea and Ghana in the 1960ies and enormous differences among the two in 
the 1990ies: 
 
“No such changes occurred in Ghana, whose per capita GNP was now about one-
fifteenth that of South Korea. How could this extraordinary difference in development 
be explained? Undoubtedly, many factors played a role, but it seemed to me that 
culture had to be a large part of the explanation. South Koreans valued thrift, 
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investment, hard work, education, organization, and discipline. Ghanaians had 
different values. In short, cultures count.”(Harrison, Huntington, 2000,XIII)(11) 
 
In short, South Koreans had a proper cultural software and were admitted to the close 
circle of the most advanced economies, while Ghanians failed to work hard enough, 
because their cultural software did not exert sufficient motivating influence upon 
them. They were lazy, corrupt and inefficient. (They also had no communist-
dominated Ghana neatly separated by an iron curtain and were not close to either 
Russia or China). This ideological approach in cultural inferiority of economically 
less developed nations is a very widespread common sense belief of most of the 
middle and low class Western Europeans facing the central and east European nation-
states ascending to the European Union. Nobody mentions the Marshall plan, the 
wartime destruction or the inefficient centralized economic system imposed on 
citizens of the states in central and Eastern Europe. Psychologically, it is much more 
comfortable for the majority of the population in Western Europe to attribute 
economic disparities to cultural softwares and to virtuous behaviour influenced by 
them (or a lack thereof). Public opinion is not easily mobilized in support of the 
enlargement of the EU, which remains to a large extent a work of the political elites in 
nation-states. Harrison’s and Huntington’s view reflects a popular belief, polished into 
an ideology and legitimised with a research program into honesty in the advanced 
economies and corruption in the least developed ones. Unfortunately, there was no 
critical response from within an academic community. Is this perhaps due to the fact 
that “professional science” with managerial hierarchies and paradigmatic 
consensuality has overshadowed “citizen science”(12) and tends to be dogmatic and 
authoritarian? Should we take heed of emergent social and intellectual movements, 
for instance critical management studies, and see them as; 
 
 “”flexibly organized cognitive praxes” that produce knowledge for enabling and 
disabling certain transformations of social life”?(Fuller,2000,403) 
 
Should we start viewing the European integration as a chance to network these 
movements in alternative patterns of meaningful cooperation? Shouldn’t we pay more 
attention to historical analogies noticed between Rostow’s hot Cold War ideological 
manifesto “Stages of Economic Growth”, Kuhn’s cool Cold War ideological 
manifesto (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and Fukuyama’s post-Cold War 
“The End of History and the Last Man”(13)? Perhaps we could thus contribute to an 
unravelling of a messy knot of the hidden injuries of Cold War in the period of 
European integration and would not be condemned to wonder, as Huntington does in 
a foreword to “Culture Matters”, quoting Robert Klitgaard, why, in spite of 
fundamental role played by cultural matters, there are no mature theories of culture 
with advanced empirical research programs and managerial procedures for 
developmental work on a global scale?         
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Notes 
 
(1) Contrasting liberals and democrats in the European political history 
between 1848 and 1968, Immanuel Wallerstein writes that the latter 
“have traditionally argued that there can be no liberty except within a 
system based on equality, since unequal persons cannot have equal 
ability to participate in collective decisions. They have also argued 
that unfree persons cannot be equal, since this implies a political 
hierarchy that thereby translates itself into social inequality. This has 
recently been given a conceptual label of egaliberty (or equaliberty) as 
a singular process.”(Wallerstein, 1999,96). He adds, however, that 
“few of the self-proclaimed left have been ready to make egaliberty 
their theme of popular mobilization, out of the very same fear that has 
made liberals insist on process and competence; fear that the people, 
given full rein, will act irrationally, meaning in a fascist or racist 
fashion.”(ibid.) 
  
(2) O’Neill continues: “Meanwhile, the sweatshops, the refugee camps 
and the prisons, do not close; exploitation and violation do not cease, 
hunger does not abate. We are asked to close our minds, to harden our 
hearts and not to cry out.”(op.cit..,p.87) 
 
(3) Prophetic praise of the forthcoming chameleon-like form of business 
organization continues with the internet-supported eBusiness as the 
refrain: “Effectiveness online is backed by strong relationship 
offline.(…) The best businesses involve this new individualism, 
operwting more like communities – with fluid oundaries, voluntary 
action, stakeholders who feel like members, a shared identity and 
culture, collective strength, and community responsibility.(…) The 
challenge is social evolution: to develop shared consciousness of the 
human community.”(Kanter, 2001,287) 
 
(4) One can compare the neoliberalist arguments, which the underlie 
Kanter’s romanticized arguments about the new work force, to the 
ones expressed by liberals piggybacking on the French revolution and 
announcing “la carriere ouverte aux talents”. Wallerstein, who noted 
this analogy, noticed elitist consequences of waging a revolution in the 
name of the whole “people”, but rewarding selectively a much more 
definable and manageable group – of those with talent, to whom 
career path will be opened.(cf. Wallerstrein, 1999,91) 
 
(5) “Organizations need to become more like communities. But they 
should not do that at the expense of the rest of community life. We 
need to nurture the places where families bond, children go to school, 
amateur sports teams practice, artists create, religious rituals and 
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personal milestones are celebrated and people meet outside of their 
work roles and help each other.”(Kanter, 2001,299) 
 
(6) Interestingly enough, recent revival of interest in George Orwell is 
based on a recognition of the latter’s simultaneous taking sides with 
the underdogs of imperialism, fascism and Stalinism. “By staying true 
to what he had won by way of his colonial experience, and to the way 
he had confirmed it by his sojourns among the empire’s internal helots 
(…), Orwell was in a stronger position to feel viscerally as well as 
intellectually about the modernist empires of Nazism and 
Stalinism.”Hitchens,2002,5) 
 
(7) This fragment has been quoted by Žižek in his essay “Class Struggle 
or postmodernism?”, where he claims that “The problem of today’s 
philosophico-political scene is ultimately best expressed by Lenin’s 
old question “What is to be done?” – how to reassert, on the political 
terrain, the proper dimensions of the act?(…) This resistance against 
the act seems to be shared across a wide spectrum of (officially) 
opposed philosophical positions. Four philosophers as different as 
Derrida, Habermas, Rorty and Dennett would probably adopt the same 
left-of-the-centre liberal democratic stance in practical political 
decisions.(…) What if there is an unacknowledged proximity between 
them? And what if the task today is precisely to break with this terrain 
of shared promises?”(Žižek, 2000,128-9) 
 
(8) While radicals and representatives of the new left mourn the neoliberal 
excesses, they meet representatives of the academic establishment, 
who moved towards the liberal centre, but occasionally respond to 
their ideological sympathies. Thus, for instance, Habermas, when 
commenting on Herbert Marcuse’s inspiring role in 1967-1968, 
mourns the fact that “we can no longer tell whether the democratic 
conception of a society that realizes itself through the will and 
consciousness of its united citizens has come to resemble an 
endearingly old-fashioned utopia, or a dangerous one. In league with a 
pessimistic anthropology, neoliberalism makes us daily more familiar 
with a new world order where social inequalities and exclusions count 
as facts of nature once more.” (Habermas, 2001,162). A representative 
of the postmodern left academics in the USA comes to similar 
conclusions: “If Marxism had any analytical value for political theory, 
was it not in the insistence that the problem of freedom was contained 
in the social relations implicitly declared unpolitical – that is 
naturalized – in liberal discourse?”(Brown,1995,14) 
 
(9) Some researchers express their passionate protest against this 
academic isolationism of managerial sciences: “The separation of 
business subjects from social science, of management from the human 
and behavioural sciences, of organization theory from sociology, has 
created a lesion which has virtually lobotomised whole areas of 
intellectual endeavour. Philosophy, art, literature, history and cultural 
studies have all become disconnected from the analysis of 
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management. These disciplines are not often classified as social 
sciences anyway but the contemporary schisms within the social 
sciences have allowed business teachers to escape without any real 
sensitivity to the issues raised by the humanities.”(Burrell, 1997,185)  
 
(10) This is the exact title of a study by Robert Lane, a political scientist 
from Yale, who echoes Rousseau in seeing the increase of material 
prosperity as a factor eroding solidarities, communities and – 
generally speaking subjective well-being. Not surprisingly, his 
suggestions are limited to an individual economy of time; each 
individual should increase the amount of “quality time” building 
relationships at the expense of a rat race for material welfare. (cf. 
Lane, 2000) 
 
(11) Huntington clearly melts managerialist ideology with an attempt to 
impose a post-Cold War dogma on developmental policies: “This 
book explores how culture in this subjective sense affects the extent to 
which and the ways in which societies achieve or fail to achieve 
progress in economic development and political democratisation.(…) 
The key issue thus is whether the political leadership can substitute for 
disaster in stimulating cultural change.”(Harrison, Huntington, 
2000,XV)  
 
(12) “In the social sciences, conceptual and technical innovations 
originating in one tradition are typically picked up and refashioned by 
other traditions, so as to convey an overall sense of history as multiple, 
partially intersecting trajectories. Indeed, just this cross-fertilization 
has historically given the social sciences an appearance of a field 
fraught with unresolvable ideological differences. However, from the 
social movement approach to knowledge production I advocate, this is 
a good thing. It means that the universal value represented by 
“science” starts to resemble that of ‘democracy”, in that both may 
flourish in a variety of social settings but, at the same time, must be 
actively maintained and renewed because of the ease with which the 
ideal can turn corrupt, especially as particular sciences or particular 
democracies become victims of their own success, e.g. governments 
whose mass popularity renders them authoritarian, sciences whose 
consensuality renders them dogmatic.” (Fuller,2000,418) 
 
(13) ibid.,pp.258-9. Fuller duly notes that analogy between a Kuhnian 
scientific revolution initiated by followers of a new paradigm and 
Rostow’s concept of an economic “take-off” has already been pointed 
out by Pocock (cf. Pocock,1973, 13 ff.). Comparing the two to 
Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis is Fuller’s contribution to the 
mapping of the hidden injuries of Cold War in science, political 
philosophy and ideology. 
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